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THE MICHIGAN CIVIL RIGHTS INITIATIVE
AND THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964
Carl Cohen* †
The underlying principle of the Michigan Civil Rights Initiative
(MCRI), adopted by state wide vote on 7 November 2006, is identical to
that of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Section 601 of the Civil Rights Act
provides: “No person in the United States shall, on the ground of race, color,
or national origin, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits
of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving
Federal financial assistance.”
The recent passage of the MCRI results now in the inclusion [in Article
1, Section 26 of the Michigan constitution] of section (2), which provides:
“The state shall not discriminate against, or grant preferential treatment to
any individual or group on the basis of race, sex, color, ethnicity or national
origin in the operation of public employment, public education or public
contracting.”
The latter but not the former includes sex as one of the impermissible
bases of discrimination, and also specifies three spheres in which the prohibition is to be effective; but the essence of the one is the essence of the
other. The Civil Rights Act is a Federal statute that remains in force. Why
then was there a need for the Michigan Civil Rights Initiative? I explain.
Some have argued that the two prohibitions differ in that the MCRI expressly prohibits ethnic preferences [by including the words “or grant
preferential treatment to”] as well as ethnic discrimination, while the Civil
Rights Act does not mention preferential treatment. Might it be that preferences were to be permitted under the Civil Rights Act? No, most assuredly
not. Members of the Congress that adopted the Civil Rights Act in the summer of 1964 knew precisely the force of what they were enacting, and they
were explicit in stating that minority preferences were certainly among the
forms of discrimination that the Act was intended to forbid.
The Civil Rights Act was adopted in the House of Representatives by a
vote of 290–130 on 10 February 1964. The ensuing debate on the Act in the
Senate was long and intense. Senator Hubert Humphrey (D, Minnesota),
soon to become Vice president and later the Democratic candidate for president, was the floor leader for the bill in the Senate; the bill was not referred
to committee, but was marked up and debated in detail on the Senate floor,
the entire body participating. Every Senator spoke; every Senator voted.
*
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Those Senators were making history, and they knew it. The record of those
debates appears in volume 110 of The Congressional Record, 1964, extending intermittently over exactly thirteen thousand pages (from page 1,511 to
page 14,511) of ten massive tomes. There is no case in which the intentions
of the Congress in the adoption of a Federal statute are more fully or more
clearly set forth.
During this extraordinary debate a group of southern senators who opposed it and who may be fairly described as racists repeatedly complained
that the bill, if adopted, would lead to preferences for minorities. Senator
Humphrey rejected that claim with disdain:
That bugaboo has been brought up a dozen times, but it is nonexistent. In
fact, the very opposite is true. [The bill] prohibits discrimination. In effect
it says that race, religion, and national origin are not to be used as the basis
for hiring and firing. . . .

In this speech Humphrey gives a series of examples that
[M]akes clear what is implicit throughout the whole [bill] . . . that individuals may not be discriminated against because of race, religion, sex, or
national origin. The truth is that this [bill] forbids discriminating against
anyone on account of race. This is the simple and complete truth.

Senator after senator rose to give the same assurance.
Senator Sparkman (D, Alabama) and Senator Smathers (D, Florida) put
the same attack against the bill more subtly. Under it, they suggested, employers might be coerced by Federal agencies into giving preference by
race. Would that not be permitted by this bill? The answer, this time from
Senator Williams (D, New Jersey) was emphatic. Opponents, he replied,
[P]ersist in opposing a provision which is not only not contained in the bill
but is specifically excluded from it. . . . [T]o hire a Negro solely because he
is a Negro is racial discrimination, just as much as a “white only” employment policy. Both forms of discrimination are prohibited by . . . this
bill. . . . Some people charge that [the bill] favors the Negro at the expense
of the white majority. But how can the language of equality favor one race
or one religion over another? Equality can have only one meaning, and that
meaning is self-evident to reasonable men. Those who say that equality
means favoritism do violence to common sense.

But the claim that racial preference for minorities would be encouraged
by the Civil Rights Act was hammered repeatedly. Senator Humphrey was
obliged to take up the battle yet again:
[The bill] does not provide that any preferential treatment. . . . shall be
given to Negroes or to any other persons or groups. . . . In fact [the bill]
would prohibit preferential treatment for any particular group, and any
person, whether or not a member of any minority group, would be permitted to file a complaint of discriminatory employment practices.

In sum: a careful and honest reading of the Civil Rights Act and of the
debates that led to its enactment leaves no possible doubt that race prefer-
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ences given by an institution receiving Federal financial assistance could not
have been lawful after the passage of that statute. That is the plain meaning
of its unambiguous language.
How then was it possible for this result to have been circumvented in
Regents of the University of California v. Bakke in 1978, and in the Michigan cases, Gratz v. Bollinger and Grutter v. Bollinger, in 2003? Justice
Powell, in his Bakke opinion, characterized the language of the Civil Rights
Act, Section 601, cited above, as “majestic in its sweep.” He noted that proponents of Title VI had “repeatedly declared that the bill enacted
constitutional principles.” That is correct, of course; an existing right to
equal treatment under the Constitution is indeed given flesh in the detail of
the Civil Rights Act. From this Justice Powell concluded that Title VI “must
be held to proscribe only those racial classifications that would violate the
Equal Protection Clause or the Fifth Amendment.” And thus in 2003, when
the race preferences given by the University of Michigan Law School were
found to be not inconsistent with the Equal Protection Clause, it appeared to
follow that those preferences could not have violated the Civil Rights Act.
Is this view of the Civil Rights Act correct? Respectfully I submit that it
is not.
The issue before the Court in Bakke was the legality of an admissions
system, at the Medical School of the University of California at Davis, in
which preference was given by race. The Court struck that system down,
and ordered Bakke admitted. Four justices there emphasized the principle
that the Court “ought not to pass on questions of constitutionality . . . unless
such adjudication is unavoidable.” They then held that a statutory resolution
of the matter at hand was in fact inescapable. Justice Stevens, writing for
these four, presented an argument of very great simplicity. The three premises were these:
Premise 1: Section 601 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 [No discrimination is
permitted under any program receiving Federal financial assistance.]
Premise 2: Preference by race—one form of discrimination—was given by
the University of California when Alan Bakke sought admission. This
was admitted and undeniable.
Premise 3: The University of California was receiving a great deal of Federal financial assistance. This was never in doubt.

Conclusion: “The plain language of the statute therefore requires” that
the lower court’s decision striking down the University’s admission system
be affirmed.
If ever there were a compelling deductive argument in appellate jurisprudence this is it. No other result could have been justified unless the cited
language of the statute misstates the actual intent of the Congress that enacted it. But the intent of the Congress in enacting the Civil Rights Act of
1964 is perfectly clear, as we have seen, and was certainly not misstated in
Section 601. Justice Stevens reviews the legislative history of the Act
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briefly, concluding that a colorblind standard on the part of government is
precisely what was intended.
At much greater length I have shown (in Affirmative Action and Racial
Preference, Oxford University Press, 2003, pp. 56–71) that this intent of the
Congress in adopting the Civil Rights Act is utterly indisputable.
Expressly, repeatedly, and very forcefully the proponents of the Act—
Senators and Congressmen, Democrats and Republicans, by the score—
explicated and illuminated the thrust of the bill they were defending; they
intended to insure the equal treatment of the races, and they most certainly
intended to forbid all racial preferences and all racial discrimination by the
state.
One may not conclude, I contend, that if in some settings race preferences are found (as in Grutter) to be consistent with the Equal Protection
Clause, that this (highly disputable) consistency vitiates the unambiguous
words and plain meaning of an Act of the United States Congress. It is true
that during the debates on the Civil Rights Act in 1964 a colorblind standard
for government agencies was taken to flow directly from the Constitution.
But that does not mean, as four justices of the court very forcefully observed
in Bakke, that the Civil Rights Act did no more than codify an existing Constitutional prohibition. The statutory prohibition against discrimination of
Section 601, these justices said, “is more than a simple paraphrasing of what
the Fifth or Fourteenth Amendment would require.” Title VI is consistent
with the Constitution, of course, and was intended as a weapon to implement the racial equality called for by the Equal Protection Clause. But the
Act also has, as those justices wrote, “independent force, with language and
emphasis in addition to that found in the Constitution.”
In a footnote Justice Stevens elaborates on the language and thrust of the
Civil Rights Act that distinguishes it from the Constitution, pointing out that
its focus on fairness to individuals rather than fairness to classes is embodied in both Title VII and Title VI of the Act. Stevens quotes a remark made
by Senator Pastore (D, Rhode Island) during the Senate debates: “The basic
fairness of title VI is so clear that I find it difficult to understand why it
should create any opposition.”
Title VI, like other provisions of the Civil Rights Act, “may independently proscribe conduct that the Constitution does not.” The applicability of
Title VI does not rely on the analysis of the Equal Protection Clause; it does
not depend upon Constitutional interpretation. In 1974 the Supreme Court
decided, in Lau v. Nichols, that the failure of the San Francisco school system to provide remedial English instruction for some 1,800 Chinesespeaking children was a violation of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act. This
result was reached expressly because discrimination based on “race, color,
or national origin” in any program or activity “receiving federal financial
assistance” was forbidden; it was not the Equal Protection Clause, but Title
VI of the Civil Rights Act that resolved the matter. Justice Douglas, presenting the conclusion of a unanimous Court in that case, was explicit: “We do
not reach the Equal Protection Clause argument which has been advanced
but rely solely on § 601 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 . . . to reverse the
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Court of Appeals.” Justice Powell himself, years later, emphasized the fact
that the decision in that case (Lau) “rested solely on the statute.” This underscores the point that the statute can speak against forms or patterns of
discrimination concerning which the Constitution may be silent.
And if ever a statute spoke, and spoke clearly, it was the Civil Rights Act
of 1964. “In unmistakable terms,” Justice Stevens writes, “the Act prohibits
the exclusion of individuals from federally funded programs because of their
race.” That is a provision of law, a provision that makes resort to the Constitution entirely unnecessary in this matter. He continues: “We are dealing
with a distinct statutory prohibition, enacted at a particular time with particular concerns in mind; neither its language nor any prior interpretation
suggests that its place in the Civil Rights Act, won after long debate, is simply that of a Constitutional appendage.”
Right. He captures here the letter and the spirit of one of the great pieces
of legislation in our national history, a statute enacted with extraordinary
care and after painstaking deliberation by a body—the Congress of the
United States—possessing the highest authority.
After the summer of 1964 race preferences given by universities receiving federal financial assistance were plainly against the law. Had this been
acknowledged decades ago, as an honest reading of Federal law required,
there would have been no need for Prop. 209 in California in 1996, for Initiative 200 in the State of Washington in 1998, or for the Michigan Civil
Rights Initiative in 2006.
The prohibition of preference by race and national origin meets with
overwhelming support by American voters whenever it is put before them.
After the striking success of the Michigan Civil Rights Initiative (58%–42%),
which was approved by the electorate in 2006 in all but three counties of the
state—in the face of well-financed opposition by corporations, universities,
and every major newspaper, and presented to voters on the ballot in language calculated to encourage opposition—it is probable that similar
initiatives will arise and be adopted in other states, perhaps in many other
states. Had the language on the Michigan ballot been taken directly from the
operative paragraph of the Initiative itself [“The state shall not discriminate
against, or grant preferential treatment to, any individual or group on the
basis of race, sex, color, ethnicity or national origin in the operation of public employment, public education, or public contracting”] which would have
been most accurate and fair, the electoral result would have been even more
lop-sided.
The Civil Rights Act of 1964 gave unambiguous concreteness to the
principle that the state may not give preference by race. That has been settled law for more than forty years. We may hope that our courts will now
attend to the plain language and unambiguous force of that Federal statute,
and by doing so will make it unnecessary for citizens to expend funds and
energies unbounded to put the very same proposition on the ballot of state
after state. How many times must that principle be formally approved before
state universities, and other institutions that find race preferences convenient, will cease their efforts to evade it? In Michigan race preference by the
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state is now a violation of our Constitution. But everywhere in the United
States today race preference by the state is a violation of Federal law.

